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The epistemology of disagreement studies the epistemically relevant aspects of the interaction between 
parties who hold diverging opinions about a given subject matter.1 The central question that the 
epistemology of disagreement purports to answer is how the involved parties should resolve an 
instance of disagreement. Answers to this central question largely depend on the epistemic position of 
each party before disagreement occurs. Two parties are equally positioned from an epistemic 
standpoint—namely, they are epistemic peers—to the extent that they have roughly equal access to the 
evidence and comparable intellectual resources. When one party is epistemically better positioned than 
the other—that is, when one is an epistemic superior—it is widely agreed that this party should retain 
their belief while the other party—the epistemic inferior—should revise their opinion in the direction 
of what the epistemic superior believes.  
Addressing the central question is a complex task when the disagreeing parties are epistemic 
peers. Three main answers can be distinguished. Conciliatory answers mandate that both parties 
revise—i.e. lower their confidence in—their beliefs upon the occurrence of peer disagreement. 
 
1 I am grateful to the editor of REP’s epistemology section, Duncan Pritchard, for including this entry in the 
encyclopedia. I also thank Michele Palmira and Tommaso Piazza for their helpful comments on an earlier 
version of the entry. Work on this entry has received funding from the EU's Horizon 2020 Research and 
Innovation Programme for the project Policy, Expertise and Trust in Action (PEriTiA) under grant agreement 
No. 870883. 
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Steadfast answers allow both parties to retain their respective beliefs, thereby committing them to 
demote the epistemic position of the interlocutor. The third group of answers suggests that the 
solution to peer disagreement depends on whether either party is highly justified in holding their belief. 
If either party is highly justified, then it is rational that this party retains its view. If neither party is 
highly justified, both should revise.  
The epistemology of disagreement addresses further important questions such as: whether the 
occurrence of disagreement opens the doors to skepticism and/or relativism; what the consequences of 
epistemic disagreement on intellectual character are; what laypeople should do when experts disagree 
with each other; and whether disagreement among groups can be treated in the same way as 
disagreement among individuals. 
 
1. Disagreement: The Central (Epistemological) Question 
My partner thinks we spent our holidays in Italy last year. I disagree: last year we went to Portugal. 
Several scientists believe that a single dose of a vaccine against Covid-19 would guarantee that entire 
populations will soon achieve herd immunity. Other experts across the globe disagree: we cannot rely 
on the efficacy of a single dose for vaccines that envisage a recall if what we care about is maximizing a 
vaccine’s safety and effectiveness. Disagreement is a pervasive and intricate phenomenon that has 
serious implications for our practical and epistemic wellbeing, at both a personal and a societal level. 
The epistemology of disagreement, a recent branch of social epistemology (add ref. to relevant entry), 
explores the epistemically relevant aspects of the interaction between disagreeing parties: typically, 
parties who hold different—and often incompatible—beliefs in a given domain. At the core of the 
epistemology of disagreement lies a Central Question: What should we do when we find out that 
someone disagrees with us—that is, believes something different than us—on some matter? Is there a 




2. Disagreeing Parties: Epistemic Peers and Non-Peers 
As a first step in seeking to answer the Central Question, it is crucial to determine the epistemic 
standing or position of the disagreeing parties. For starters, one’s physical or psychological conditions 
can make one better placed epistemically than another to hold a true belief. Some illnesses and the 
effect of drugs, among other things, can impair one’s cognitive functioning. For example, my partner 
would surely be in a better epistemic position than I am to report where we spent our holidays last year 
if I had been recently suffering from episodes of memory loss. 
In general, two main epistemic factors contribute to determining the epistemic position of the 
disagreeing parties: the amount of evidence at their disposal, and their intellectual resources 
(Christensen 2007; Elga 2007; Frances 2014; Kelly 2005; Lackey 2010). As regards the former, someone 
is better epistemically positioned than another when one is more familiar with the evidence and 
arguments relevant to the matter at issue than the other party. As regards the latter, someone is better 
epistemically positioned than another when one has more or better intellectual resources, where this 
typically encompasses freedom from bias and intellectual virtues such as intellectual honesty, 
thoroughness, and open-mindedness.  
To the extent that either party is better epistemically positioned than the other in the relevant 
senses just presented, the disagreeing parties are considered to be epistemic non-peers. Unsurprisingly, the 
Central Question of the epistemology of disagreement invites a quite straightforward answer in cases of 
non-peer disagreement—at least, in those in which both parties acknowledge that they are epistemic 
non-peers. As far as one party is epistemically inferior—that is, worse positioned—than the other, it is 
generally rational that the former aligns with the latter’s view on the matter at issue (Elga 2007). This is 
what should happen if I suffer from memory loss and disagree with my partner about the location of 
some past event we attended together. Or when a layperson disagrees with a virologist about the safety 
of some vaccine. Whether the epistemically inferior party should defer entirely to the epistemically 
superior one—as opposed to including evidence that a better-positioned interlocutor disagrees with 
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them in the balance of reason—is a debated issue at the crossroads of the epistemology of 
disagreement and the epistemology of expertise (Croce 2018; Lackey 2018; Zagzebski 2012).  
The disagreement between epistemic peers requires a different diagnosis because it concerns 
situations in which the Central Question cannot be addressed by appealing to a pre-existing inequality 
in epistemic standings of the disagreeing parties. It is important to note from the outset that epistemic 
peerhood is a largely idealized notion (Frances 2014; King 2012). It is extremely rare to find any real 
case of disagreement in which the disagreeing parties are in the same physical and epistemic conditions. 
More plausibly, they are reasonable in taking each other to be epistemic peers based on an 
approximation of their current epistemic position regarding the matter at issue at the time in which the 
disagreement occurs (Lackey 2010). Such approximation might involve different—at least to some 
extent—scores in the three components of the epistemic position. One party might enjoy a slight 
positional advantage over the other but lack some of the intellectual virtues the other displays in 
reasoning about the issue. 
Before introducing available answers to the Central Question in cases of peer disagreement, 
consider a further set of cases of disagreement, one in which the disagreeing parties do not know 
whether the interlocutor is their epistemic peer. This is most common in cases of disagreement with 
people with whom we are not sufficiently acquainted to assess their epistemic standing, but also when 
the disagreement concerns controversial issues. It seems reasonable to treat this category of 
disagreement just like the disagreement between peers. For if we have no reason to consider the 
interlocutor epistemically superior or inferior to us, responding to the Central Question incurs the same 
obstacles that are involved in peer disagreement.  
 
3. Addressing the Central Question: Conciliatory Solutions 
One helpful way to account for the distinctive impact of peer disagreement is in reference to the larger 
epistemological discussion about higher-order evidence and epistemic defeaters (add ref. to relevant 
entry). Higher-order evidence is evidence about the quality of ordinary first-order evidence. The fact that 
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I form the belief that P—that my partner and I spent our last holidays in Portugal—based on a given 
body of evidence (E) constitutes higher-order evidence: that is, evidence about the quality of E—
evidence that E supports P. It is often said that the epistemology of disagreement is concerned with 
higher-order evidence precisely because the occurrence of disagreement can constitute higher-order 
evidence too. In the example, my partner’s opinion that we did not spend our last holidays in Portugal 
can be understood as higher-order evidence that E does not support P. Whether higher-order evidence 
provided by peer disagreement defeats one’s evidence for a given belief depends on the view of 
epistemic disagreement one endorses.  
Conciliatory or conformist views understand peer disagreement as higher-order defeat. The fact that 
an epistemic peer like my partner disagrees with me about the location of our last holiday is a higher-
order defeater for my belief that we were in Portugal. Once two equally positioned parties acknowledge 
that they disagree, then both should do something to clear up the issue: that is, both should conciliate. 
This is why conciliatory views answer the Central Question by saying that peer disagreement always 
calls for doxastic revision from both parties. 
The most prominent conciliatory view is the Equal Weight View. Its doctrine is rather simple: 
once you grant that the disagreeing parties are epistemic peers, each has to treat the interlocutor’s 
opinion as seriously as one treats one’s own—that is, by assigning equal weight to one’s own opinion 
and the interlocutor’s opinion. The specifics of the required revision vary with the view one endorses. 
For views admitting a graded conception of belief, assigning equal weight boils down to reducing 
confidence in one’s belief (Christensen 2007; Elga 2007). If my partner has a 0.8 belief that we spent 
our holidays in Italy last year (P), while I have a 0.4 belief that P, the Equal Weight View requires that 
we “split the difference” and meet in between: thus, we should both end up having a 0.6 belief that P. 
For views only admitting full attitudes such as belief or disbelief, assigning equal weight boils down to 
suspending judgment (Feldman 2006). If my partner believes that P while I believe that ¬P, the only 
reasonable way for us to resolve the disagreement while remaining faithful to the judgment that we are 
epistemic peers amounts to withholding our respective beliefs.  
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In both cases, assigning extra weight to one’s own opinion would be irrational, as it would 
amount to treating the other party as an epistemic inferior rather than a peer. This would in turn 
legitimize a “bootstrapping” procedure whereby one becomes more confident that one is better at 
evaluating the evidence than the other party based on the mere fact that they disagree with us (Elga 
2007). To avoid this risk, the Equal Weight View commits to the so-called principle of Independence 
(Christensen 2009): 
 
In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another person’s belief about P, to determine how (if 
at all) to modify one’s own belief about P, one should do so in a way that is independent of the 
reasoning behind one’s own initial belief about P. 
 
In practice, the principle of Independence says that I cannot rely on the fact that my partner disagrees 
with me about the location of our last holiday to demote them as my peer. Counterexamples to the 
principle have been offered, e.g., in Kelly (2013) and Lord (2014).  
An important objection against the Equal Weight View (and any conciliatory view, in general) is 
that they are self-defeating (Elga 2010; Littlejohn 2020). In short, the problem is that applying the view 
to itself would have self-undermining consequences. If two epistemic peers disagree about the Equal 
Weight View as a response to the Central Question, then this view mandates that both parties revise 
their beliefs. But revising one’s beliefs, for a defender of the Equal Weight View, requires one to 
downgrade one’s assessment of the view itself: hence the charge with self-defeat. 
 
4. Addressing the Central Question: Steadfast Solutions 
Steadfast or non-conformist views understand peer disagreement oppositely: that is, by conceding that if we 
“have done the math” correctly, we cannot be asked to revise our belief, as it is most likely that our 
interlocutor has formed the wrong opinion. If I have a clear memory that last year my partner and I 
spent our holidays in Portugal, the best explanation for why my partner has a different memory is that 
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their memory failed them in this particular instance. Thus, steadfast views reject the principle of 
Independence and appeal to the occurrence of disagreement to argue that both parties can stick to their 
guns. The main challenge for proponents of these solutions is to explain why getting to know that an 
alleged epistemic peer disagrees with us does not necessarily call for a doxastic revision on our part—
or, to put it differently, why peer disagreement does not always provide both parties with a higher-
order defeater. 
The most prominent way to address the challenge is to maintain that there is an ineludible 
asymmetry between the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective; or, between the 
evidence we acquire on our own and the evidence others share with us (Sosa 2010). Several proponents 
of the steadfast view justify this asymmetry by appealing to the role that self-trust plays in the 
formation and rational evaluation of our beliefs (Enoch 2010; Foley 2001; Zagzebski 2012). Self-trust is 
trust in the activity of our cognitive faculties: that is, trust that they are reliable in providing us with 
evidence for the beliefs we form. If it is rational to trust our conscientious judgment that the evidence 
supports our belief, as advocates of this view maintain, then it is also rational to stick to this judgment 
and disregard the opinion of a peer when we discover that they disagree with us. In short, these views 
legitimize an egocentric bias (Wedgwood 2007). Relevant objections to this approach are offered in 
Peter (2019). 
Others account for the asymmetry by appealing to private evidence (van Inwagen 1996). Unlike 
the argument based on self-trust, which locates the asymmetry in the privilege each subject has in 
warranting the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties, the argument based on private evidence locates the 
asymmetry in the evidence itself that each subject has at their disposal. Epistemic peers share most of 
their evidence but not all of it: for our evidence includes some special insight—e.g., some intuitions—
that we cannot communicate to others but that contribute to the body of evidence supporting our 
beliefs.  
A third way to address the challenge for proponents of steadfast approaches is offered by the 
Right Reasons View and comes from criticism of how the Equal Weight View handles the balance 
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between first-order and higher-order evidence (Kelly 2005). Suppose one holds a belief P justified by 
first-order evidence E. Once one is put before a disagreeing peer, one’s evidence E* for P encompasses 
not only (a) the fact that one believes P based on E, and (b) the fact that an epistemic peer believes ¬P 
based on E, but also (c) the original first-order evidence E for P. The Equal Weight View is right to 
judge that the two pieces of higher-order evidence, (a) and (b), cancel each other out, but it draws the 
wrong conclusions from this fact. Far from mandating that both parties should revise their doxastic 
attitudes, the balance of reasons shows that the solution to peer disagreement entirely depends on (c): 
that is, the original first-order evidence E, which keeps doing its warranting job for the party that was 
justified in believing P before disagreement occurred. Thus, pace conformists, the Right Reasons View 
mandates that the party who was originally justified in believing P by E—that is, the one who 
possessed the right reasons—should not conciliate but stick to their guns. 
Note that, despite proposing a steadfast answer to the Central Question, the Right Reasons 
View does not appeal to an asymmetry between the first-person and the third-person perspective, but 
rather to an asymmetry between a party holding a justified belief and a party holding an unjustified 
belief. If previous steadfast approaches granted both parties the right not to conciliate before an 
instance of peer disagreement, on the Right Reasons View this is a privilege that only the party 
possessing the right reasons enjoys. Arguments against the Right Reasons View have been offered, 
among others, in Kelly (2010) and Matheson (2009). 
 
5. Addressing the Central Question: Alternative Solutions 
Alternative answers to the Central Question have been offered, among others (Lasonen-Aarnio 2013; 
Palmira 2019), by the Justificationist View and the Total Evidence View. Both can be taken to sit 
somewhere between conciliatory and steadfast views. The Justificationist View (Lackey 2010) mandates 
very different doxastic responses to peer disagreement depending on the antecedent level of 
justification one has in favor of the disputed belief. In particular, this view sides with the Equal Weight 
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View in all cases in which one lacks a high degree of antecedent justification for a belief P, while it 
requires a steadfast response whenever one has a high degree of antecedent justification for P.  
The justificationist solution to peer disagreement is grounded in the following intuition. If in 
many ordinary cases—e.g., the disagreement I have with my partner about where we spent our holidays 
last year—the fact that the disagreeing party is one’s peer prevents one from holding firm to one’s 
belief, in other, more extreme, cases—e.g., disagreements about whether 3+3=6 or basic perceptual 
experiences like the presence of a known person at a dinner table—one has such strong reasons to 
think one has got things right that the only reasonable explanation for the disagreement is that the 
other party is mistaken.   
The Justificationist View warrants a steadfast response to extreme cases of disagreement by 
rejecting the principle of Independence. The high level of antecedent justification one has in situations 
of that sort can be used to reopen the question about the epistemic standing of the disagreeing party 
and establish that they are not an epistemic peer on the matter at hand. Failing to do that would go 
against the constraints of rationality as it would not do justice to the justification one already possesses 
in favor of one’s belief.  
The Total Evidence View is best understood as a revision of the Equal Weight View but also as 
a rejection of the Right Reasons View by its original proponent (Kelly 2010). The central idea of this 
approach is that a solution to peer disagreement requires that one weighs the total evidence one 
possesses, where this encompasses both the available higher-order evidence and the first-order 
evidence one has in favor of one’s belief. According to this approach, the Right Reasons View 
mischaracterizes the import of the higher-order evidence in responding to peer disagreement, while the 
Equal Weight View understates the relevance of the first-order evidence.  
More specifically, the problem with the Right Reasons View lies with the moral it draws from 
the balancing of higher-order evidence—that is, (a) and (b) in the earlier formulation. It is not as 
though (a) and (b) “cancel out” each other; rather, the fact that they push in opposite directions reveals 
that higher-order evidence calls for some sort of doxastic revision on the part of both disagreeing 
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parties. Thus, higher-order evidence in peer disagreement always counts toward attaching a reduced 
weight to the original evidence each party had before the disagreement occurred, no matter who had 
the right reasons in the first place. Here is where the Equal Weight View gets the story wrong too: for 
the original first-order evidence still has to be included in the balance of reasons. Hence, splitting the 
difference or suspending judgment are the rational responses to peer disagreement only insofar as the 
higher-order evidence counterbalances the first-order evidence. If the original evidence strongly 
supports one’s belief, higher-order evidence provided by the occurrence of peer disagreement requires 
only a small revision on the part of the justified party, who is overall entitled to stick to their guns and 
retain their belief.  
 
6. Skepticism, Dogmatism, and Intellectual Humility 
The discussion of the pros and cons of conciliatory and steadfast views sheds light on two main risks 
we incur when disagreement arises: skepticism and dogmatism. Conciliatory views are most likely to 
face a skeptical threat: if we cannot hold on to our beliefs in the face of peer disagreement, then such 
disputed beliefs cannot amount to knowledge. The fact that disagreement is widespread amplifies the 
problem and puts at risk a substantial body of what we generally take to know (Goldberg 2009; 
Machuca 2013). Steadfast views, by contrast, are charged with dogmatism because they seem to grant 
us the right to privilege our own view over the opinion of a disagreeing party who we take to be as 
epistemically well positioned as we are (Pritchard 2013).  
A further important issue related to how we respond to disagreement concerns the implications 
of these answers for intellectual character. Sticking to one’s guns in the face of disagreement, as 
steadfast views allow, is often seen as a sign of an absence of intellectual humility, if not as a marker of 
intellectual arrogance. Intellectually humble subjects would admit their limitations before a disagreeing 
party—especially if these virtuous subjects acknowledge the interlocutor as an epistemic peer—and be 
willing to revise their opinion (Christensen 2009). However, much depends on how the virtue of 
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intellectual humility is understood: steadfast responses to disagreement do not necessarily exclude that 
the disagreeing peers display intellectual humility (Pritchard 2018).   
 
7. Further Issues in the Epistemology of Disagreement 
The epistemology of disagreement extends beyond answering the Central Question. Peculiar challenges 
are raised by a particular kind of peer disagreement: namely, disagreement among experts (Conee 2009) 
and, most prominently, within science (Dellsen & Baghramian 2020). Pressing issues concern, among 
other topics, whether scientific disagreement should pave the way to relativism (Massimi 2019; add ref to 
entry on epistemic relativism) as well as how laypeople should decide whom to trust when experts 
disagree (Goldman 2001; Dellsen 2018). Disagreement within controversial fields such as politics, 
ethics, philosophy, and religion (Lackey 2018; Sosa 2010) is the locus of a rich discussion. Besides 
specific problems related to the occurrence of disagreement in each of these disciplines (Frances 2010; 
Hallsson 2019; Rowland 2017; Thune 2010), the debate focuses on disagreement about our most 
fundamental commitments: the so-called deep disagreement (Kappel 2012) or the seemingly rival hinge 
disagreement (Coliva & Palmira 2020; Ranalli 2020). Finally, the recent turn to collective epistemology has 
raised new questions about the nature of disagreement among groups and its relation to disagreement 
among individual epistemic subjects (Broncano-Berrocal & Carter 2020).  
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